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CLASS DISMISSED: CONTEMPORARY JUDICIAL
HOSTILITY TO SMALL-CLAIMS CONSUMER
CLASS ACTIONS
Myriam Gilles*

INTRODUCTION

The small claims of a dispersed group of consumers injured by a
broad range of marketplace abuses were undoubtedly in the minds of
the drafters who in 1966 helped shape Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, as well as the judges who later interpreted and applied the Rule.1 As the Supreme Court famously stated in Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive
for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries
into something worth someone's
2
(usually an attorney's) labor.
Congress has, over time, evinced a similar concern for the rights of
small-claims consumers by enacting federal consumer legislation that
expressly contemplates class action litigation as a means of redress.
* Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Thanks to Stephan Landsman for organizing a terrific conference, as well as to Anthony Sebok, Gary Friedman, and the participants in
the NYC Area Scholarship Group for their careful reading of and thoughtful comments on this
Article.
1. See Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005
Class Action FairnessAct: "The PoliticalSafeguards" of Aggregate TranslocalActions, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 1929, 1940 (2007) ("As for the focus on the consumer, securities, and antitrust cases, the
drafters of Rule 23 assumed that groups of plaintiffs, assisted by lawyers attracted by fees, would
enable federal judges to enforce federal regulations aimed at corporate misbehavior.").
2. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S.
326, 339 (1980) ("Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional
framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be
without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action device."); Buford v. H & R
Block, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 340, 345 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (noting that an essential purpose of class actions
is "to provide a feasible means for asserting the rights of those who 'would have no realistic day
in court if a class action were not available"' (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S.
797, 809 (1985))).
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The Truth in Lending Act, 3 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 4 and various
other federal consumer protection laws 5 specifically envision that col-

lective litigation efforts will comprise a central mechanism of statutory
enforcement. In other federal statutory schemes, such as antitrust,
courts have observed that private class action enforcement is an indispensable enforcement mechanism. 6 As Mark Budnitz notes, "Recog-

nizing the resource limitations of government agencies, many
consumer laws provide a private right of action so individual consumers also can litigate violations of these laws. Many of these laws also
provide class actions and statutory damages which encourage consum7
ers to act as 'private attorneys general."
Nearly every state also has laws on its books to protect small-claims
consumers, 8 and many of these statutes expressly anticipate consumer

3. Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2006). TILA regulates the disclosure of credit terms and discrimination in determining credit limits, and it specifically provides that plaintiffs may recover "in the case of a class action, such amount as the court may
allow." Id.
4. Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x; see also White v. E-Loan,
Inc., No. C 05-0280 SI, 2006 WL 2411420, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2006) ("[W]ithout class
actions, there is unlikely to be any meaningful enforcement of the FCRA by consumers whose
rights have been violated.").
5. See, e.g., Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667-1667e (2006); Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p
(2006); Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952
(2003).
6. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) ("[P]etitioner's individual
stake in the damages award he seeks is only $70. No competent attorney would undertake this
complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an amount. Economic reality dictates
that petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or not at all."); In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig.
554 F.3d 300, 312 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing, in the context of an antitrust claim, the "utility of
the class action as a vehicle for vindicating statutory rights," especially where "a large group of
individuals or entities has suffered an alleged wrong, but the damages due to any single individual or entity are too small to justify bringing an individual action").
7. Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalizationand Privatizationof Public Consumer Protection Law
in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 663, 664
(2008); see also Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 687 (1941) (early commentators asserting that class actions
serve to complement enforcement efforts by public regulatory agencies).
8. See William L. Stern, The Reliance Element in State Consumer-FraudClass Actions, 23 REV.
BANK. & FIN. SERV., Jan. 2007, at 1, 2. Stern states that
[a]ll 50 states plus the District of Columbia have enacted some form of [legislation] ....
which prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" in commerce. These state laws
travel under different names-unfair and deceptive trade practices acts ("UDTPA"),
consumer fraud acts, unfair competition laws, etc.-but share common characteristics.
They all have broad applicability to consumer transactions and all are designed to prevent consumer deception or false advertising, or both.
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class actions as a principal means of enforcement. 9 Enacted by states
during the 1970s as part of the emerging consumer rights movement,
unfair and deceptive trade practices statutes reach a broad range of
consumer transactions. As one pro-defense commentator notes, violations of state unfair practices statutes "have become the most commonly-asserted claims in consumer class action cases, and it is a rare
class action nowadays that does not feature" a state consumer protection law cause of action.' 0
Thus, it should be fairly uncontroversial to observe that smallclaims consumer cases are a-if not the-primary reason why class
actions exist, and that without class actions many-if not most-of the
wrongs perpetrated upon small-claims consumers would not be capable of redress. 1
Against that backdrop, it might seem odd if the lower federal courts
were to develop a set of doctrines under which the majority of smallclaims consumer class actions were deemed ineligible for class
treatment.
And yet that is the story of small-claims consumer class litigation
over the past decade, as federal district courts have repeatedly declined to certify class actions on grounds that are specific to smallclaims consumer cases. Foremost among those grounds is the notion
that the federal class action rule carries within it an implicit requirement of "ascertainability." More specifically, courts have held that in
order to certify a class, the identity of class members must be sufficiently ascertainable to ensure the efficacy of a subsequent distribution of damages. In practice, what this shadow standard of
ascertainability has come to mean is that no matter how clear the evidence of wrongdoing, plaintiffs have no redress in the typical consumer case involving small retail transactions.
The emergence of the ascertainability requirement marks a broader
shift in judicial philosophy. As John Coffee recently noted, "[F]or
better or worse, it is today clear that the tide has turned against class
certification, and new barriers have arisen across a variety of contexts
9. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 24-5-0.5-3 (Supp. 2001) (authorizing class actions in deceptive sales
act); FLA. STAT. § 501.201 (2008); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 342-b, 349 (McKinney 2004); Wis.
STAT. § 100.20 (2004).
10. Stern, supra note 8, at 2.
11. See Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth:
The Social Utility of EntrepreneurialLawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REv.103, 104 n.5 (2006) (defining
small-claims actions as "including virtually all consumer class cases, and many claims arising
under banking, insurance, and other laws," but excluding "employment, antitrust, and securities
actions, and virtually all mass tort class actions").
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where formerly class certification had seemed automatic. '12 In the
1970s and 1980s, courts regularly certified small-claims consumer class
actions,' 3 even when, as was typical, the identities of most class members were unknowable. 14 Today, this paradigmatic small-claims consumer class action is more often than not uncertifiable.
This Article will examine the doctrinal bases for the increasing hostility to small-claims consumer class actions, with a view towards identifying the perspectival theories that animate these developments.
Specifically, it will focus on the emergence of the extra-statutory ascertainability requirement as it has been grafted onto the class certification analysis in recent years. Underlying this doctrinal
development, I will assert, is a conservative conception of justice that
is generally offended by liberal notions of broad representational
standing15-a view that is less concerned with vindicating the value of
deterrence than it is with fidelity to a traditional paradigm of justice
that features a single injured claimant who pursues compensation
16
through litigation.
It is useful to think of these divergent views as, respectively, the
private law and the public law conceptions of class actions. The private law conception understands a class action as a collective of oneon-one disputes between private parties. In the classic private law action, the party that suffered injury is the party pressing the action:
there is total unity between victim and plaintiff. And the coin of the
12. John C. Coffee & Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments over the Last Five
Years, 2002-2007, in 8 CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 2008: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES 195, 195-96 (2007).
13. See, e.g., Alec Johnson, Vioxx and Consumer Product Pain Relief- The Policy Implications
of Limiting Courts' Regulatory Influence over Mass Consumer Product Claims, 41 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 1039, 1047 (2008) (observing that beginning in the 1980s and continuing through the early
1990s, "federal courts began to expand the scope of the class action mechanism ... largely
because of the increases in group settlements that accompanied class certification").
14. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Super. Ct. of San Joaquin Valley, 484 P.2d 964, 969-70 (Cal. 1971)
(class certified in a fraudulent misrepresentation case involving hundreds of potential class members); Metowski v. Triad Corp., 104 Cal. Rptr. 599, 601-02 (1972) (class certified in a case involving over 100,000 people who had purchased a product, with no clear means of locating most class
members); Miner v. Gillette Co., 428 N.E.2d 478, 484 (I1. 1981) (class of nearly 200,000 consumers certified, despite the inability to locate the majority of the class members); Delgozzo v.
Kenny, 628 A.2d 1080 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (certifying a class of over 35,000 purchasers of water heaters in twenty-eight states, with purchases dating back over ten years).
15. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, RepresentationalStanding: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future
of Public Law Litigation, 89 CAL. L. Rav. 315, 367 (2001) (reviewing the historical development
of strict standing doctrine and asserting that the "constitutionalization" of the rules governing
Article III standing represents the triumph of a conservative vision of rights enforcement).
16. See Andrew D. Thibedeau, Vindicating the Public Interest?: The Public Law Implications
of Attorneys' Fee Restrictions in Class Actions, 13 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 231, 232
(2008) (describing traditional litigation as "a bipolar enterprise undertaken as a contest between
two adverse interests").
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realm is compensation: the private law model is "[p]redominantly concerned with past events [and] looks chiefly to compensate parties previously harmed. '17 This model is not particularly concerned with
deterrence, punishment, or the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. Accordingly, small-claims consumer class actions, in which relatively few
of the injured parties stand to reap compensation, are inherently suspect on the private law view, no matter how effective the class vehicle
may be at deterring misconduct.
By contrast, the public law conception understands class actions as a
means for private citizens to enforce public values. The term "public
law" was famously coined by Abram Chayes, who distinguished between a private law model, which is built on disputes "between private
parties about private rights," and a public law model, which is characterized by a broad understanding of affected parties and by a managerial judiciary engaged in developing creative remedial schemes.1 8 The
public law view readily accommodates small-claims consumer class actions, just as it does other forms of representative litigation. Indeed,
this view prioritizes the deterrence function of small-claims class actions, and as a consequence, it is highly tolerant of remedies that "may
not provide full direct compensation to plaintiffs [but that] can force
guilty defendants to disgorge ill-gotten gains."1 9
The emergence of the ascertainability doctrine marks a high water
point for the private law conception of the class action device. Part II
shows that the ascertainability doctrine is entirely incoherent when
viewed from the perch of a public law conception of class actions-or
indeed, from any perspective other than one that prizes above all else
a total unity of the injured party and the person prosecuting the
20
action.
The price for this orthodoxy is steep. As some district judges have
candidly acknowledged, the rigorous application of the ascertainability requirement will often entail impunity for corporate defendants who perpetrate harms in relatively modest increments upon
large numbers of consumers. 21 What is not entirely obvious is why
courts believe that this is a price worth paying. Part III explores why
17. Id.
18. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284, 1295-96 (1976).
19. Kerry Barnett, Note, Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class Actions,
96 YALE L.J. 1591, 1593 (1987).
20. See infra notes 25-76 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Thompson v. Am. Tobacco Co., 189 F.R.D. 544, 556 (D. Minn. 1999) (stating,
where it was alleged that "a class action is the only viable remedy for Plaintiffs given the enormous financial burden of independently pursuing litigation," that "[a]lthough it is difficult to
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we are comfortable elsewhere in the law tolerating a significant level

of "disunity" between the injured party and the person prosecuting an
action. 22 These public law values support practices such as the imposition of punitive damages in private actions 23 and the promulgation of
24
rules that govern standing in antitrust cases.

And yet, in the class action arena, public law values are regarded
with tremendous suspicion. A real world by-product of the hegemony

of the private law conception is that the classic small-claims consumer
class action has become largely uncertifiable. Uneasiness with dis-

unity-with the possibility of compensating uninjured parties-has
led courts to abandon the cases at the very core of Rule 23.
II.

THE ASCERTAINABILITY DOCTRINE

A number of courts have now found within Rule 23 an "implicit"
requirement that plaintiffs, in order to certify a class, must prove that
the identities of the members of the class are "ascertainable. '2 5 There

are several reasons courts give for imposing this extra-textual ascertainability requirement: concerns about manageability in the distribution of damages, perceived difficulties in showing proof of injury,
and doubts about the effective provision of notice to class members.
At the outset, many courts have held that without reliable proof of
purchase or a knowable list of injured plaintiffs at the certification
stage, damages cannot reliably be distributed to potential claimants at
the subsequent remedial stage of the litigation. Typically, this concern
is framed in terms of the "manageability" requirement of Rule
23(b)(3). 26 That is, courts are skeptical that the class device is "manignore this reality, it is not a sufficient reason to headlong plunge into an unmanageable and
interminable litigation process" (quotation marks omitted)). Courts also recognize that
because of the small amount of individual damages at issue, alternative methods to
adjudication by a class may be realistically lacking for individuals without any proof of
purchase. However, "the desirability of allowing small claimants a forum to recover for
largescale [ ] violations does not eclipse the problem of unmanageability.
In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 620-21 (W.D. Wash. 2003)
(quoting In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1974)).
22. See infra notes 77-106 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., McBean v. City of New York, 228 F.R.D. 487, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing
the implicit but fundamental requirement that "[t]he class that plaintiffs seek to certify must be
readily identifiable so that the court can determine who is in the class").
26. See, e.g., In re PPA, 214 F.R.D. at 616 ("The manageability determination 'encompasses
the whole range of practical problems that may render the class action format inappropriate for
a particular suit."' (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164 (1974))); City of
Philadelphia v. Am. Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72 (D.N.J. 1971) ("It is readily apparent that no
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ageable" if there is no surefire way to get damages into the hands of
the individuals who suffered an injury.
As a corollary, the same basic proof of purchase concern can be
reframed as a matter of Rule 23(b)(3) "predominance. '2 7 When a
plaintiff claims to have suffered injury as a result of purchasing the
item in question, raising the issue of whether the proffered proof consists of a naked oath or documentary evidence, courts have held that
the defendant is entitled to challenge the proof of purchase and
"cross-examine each class member[ ] regarding that alleged injury. '28
If a defendant is entitled to cross-examine 1,000 putative class members on their proof of purchase and injury, then a court is likely to find
that individual factual questions predominate over common ones. 29
These concerns appear to have been first articulated, although in
reverse order, in a 1981 Seventh Circuit decision:
Identification of the class serves at least two obvious purposes in the
context of certification. First, it alerts the court and parties to the
burdens that such a process might entail. In this way the court can
decide whether the class device simply would be an inefficient way
of trying the lawsuit .... Second, identifying the class insures that
those actually harmed by defendants' wrongful conduct will be the
recipients of the relief eventually provided. 30
In addition, a number of courts have evinced the distinct concern
that the lack of an ascertainable roster of injured parties impedes the
provision of constitutionally adequate notice and opportunity to opt

matter how easy it is to establish damages on a class level, if it is extremely difficult or almost
impossible to distribute these sums to their rightful recipients, the class is unmanageable.").
27. See, e.g., In re PPA, 214 F.R.D. at 616, which states that
Rule 23(b)(3) allows for class certification where the court finds that the questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
28. Id. at 619.
29. See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix Res. Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) ("If each
class member has to litigate numerous and substantial separate issues to establish his or her right
to recover individually, a class action is not 'superior."'); O'Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 197
F.R.D. 404, 415 (C.D. Cal. 2000) ("[A] class action is improper where an individual class member would be compelled to try numerous and substantial issues to establish his or her right to
recover individually, after liability to the class is established."). See also In re Teflon Prods. Liab.
Litig., 254 F.R.D. 354, 370 (S.D. Iowa 2008), which states that
[in order to recover, each plaintiff may be required to show that he or she purchased
[the complained-of product] within the time period allowed under the applicable statute of limitations. Each of these issues will require an individualized inquiry, which the
Court believes will render each class action unmanageable.
30. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 670 (7th Cir. 1981).
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out of the class action lawsuit. 31 As a matter of doctrinal pigeon-holing, this issue can also be conceptualized as a manageability problem

32
under Rule 23(b)(3) or a free-standing issue of due process.
But whether cast as an issue involving Rule 23's predominance re-

quirement or as a due process notice concern, the core problem the
ascertainability doctrine seeks to address is that, in most small-claims
consumer class actions, there exist no reliable means of determining
the identity of injured class members for purposes of managing and
distributing damages to those individuals.
A.

Damages Manageability

The clearest manifestation of the ascertainability doctrine is the

court's focus on proof of purchase as a means of ensuring that a traditional remedial scheme will be workable down the line. In recent
years, district courts have begun to require actual proof of purchase at
the class certification stage, by way of receipts, wrappers, box tops,
and the like, asserting that this "objective standard" ensures that the
class is "capable of ascertainment. ' 33 This proof requirement presents
daunting problems in most small-claims consumer class actions. Who,
after all, has proof that they purchased peanut butter, pineapples, or

aspirin?
There are a number of recent cases denying class certification on
proof-of-purchase and ascertainability grounds, including cases involving purchases of Teflon cookware, 34 Lipitor,35 peanut butter, 36 and
31. See, e.g., Van West v. Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 199 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D.R.I. 2001) (noting that the ascertainability of class members is important so that a court can decide "who will
receive notice, who will share in any recovery, and who will be bound by the judgment").
32. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) (describing the important constitutional dimensions of class notice for future rights preclusion).
33. In re Teflon Prods. Liab. Litig., 254 F.R.D. at 360; see also In re Paxil Litig., 212 F.R.D.
539, 545 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (declining certification where the plaintiff defined the proposed class in
such a manner as to make the actual composition of the class only determinable at the conclusion of the proceedings); In re PPA Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 617 (W.D. Wash. 2003)
(noting that plaintiff "class members [must] supply either physical proof of purchase and possession, such as the actual product, product packaging, or a receipt, or submit a certified oath or
verification attesting to purchase and possession"); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 185 F.
Supp. 2d 519, 523 n.2 (D. Md. 2002) (finding it economically unfeasible to distribute the proceeds of a settlement to consumers in part because "many individual consumers would not have
retained proof of purchase documents").
34. See generally In re Teflon Prods. Liab. Litig., 254 F.R.D. 354 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 5, 2008)
(seeking class treatment for personal and economic injury where defendant allegedly made false,
misleading, and deceptive representations regarding the safety of its non-stick cookware).
35. See generally Dumas v. Albers Med., Inc., No. 03-0640-CV-W-GAF, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33482 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2005) (seeking class treatment for personal and economic injury claims stemming from purchase of counterfeit Lipitor).

2010]

HOSTILITY TO CLASS ACTIONS

common cold remedies. 37 The most thorough exploration of this concept is probably Judge Berman's decision in In re Fresh Del Monte
Pineapples,which involved claims by pineapple purchasers who were
overcharged after the defendant monopolized the market by illegally
38
obtaining a patent.
The Fresh Del Monte Pineapples court expressed concern with the
ascertainability of the membership of the class. In particular, the
court found that the proposed class failed the "manageability" prong
of Rule 23(b)(3) because without a reliable means of ascertaining the
identity of injured purchasers, there was no way to ensure that the
damages would get into the hands of the individuals who suffered an
39
injury.
To address the court's concerns with remedial workability, the
plaintiffs' expert proposed three possible modes of distributing relief
to the class: "(1) automatic price reductions on Del Monte Gold Pineapples by placing a coupon on the hang tags attached to those pineapples, (2) a formal claims procedure in which class members could
obtain coupons or cash relief, and (3) a cy pres distribution. ' 40 An
examination of the court's rejection of each of these schemes provides
a uniquely illuminating vantage point from which to consider the fundamental normative issues that are at the core of this Article.
1.

Automatic Price Reductions: The Compensating-the-Uninjured
Problem

The court rejected an automatic price reduction system wherein
each purchaser of a Fresh Del Monte pineapple would receive a reduction at the cash register on the price of the fruit. According to
Judge Berman, this is an imperfect damages delivery mechanism because it creates a disunity between (1) injured parties (i.e., past pineapple purchasers who incurred the overcharge) and (2) the
beneficiaries of the price reduction (i.e., future pineapple purchasers).
It may stand to reason that yesterday's pineapple purchasers will comprise a significant portion of tomorrow's purchasers-and the plain36. See generally In re Conagra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689 (N.D. Ga.
2008) (seeking class treatment for personal and economic injury claims arising from peanut butter contaminated by Salmonella bacteria).
37. See generally In re PPA Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 617 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (seeking class treatment for personal and economic injury claims stemming from purchase of medication containing phenylpropanolamine).
38. See In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapples Antitrust Litig., No. 1:04-md-1628 (RMB), 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008).
39. See id.
40. Id. at *22.
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tiffs purported to present some evidence to that effect4 1-but the
court was primarily interested in ensuring that no uninjured parties, in
the form of future first-time purchasers, shared in the relief: "The people who are [currently] purchasing for the first time would not have
suffered damages but would still get the benefit of the automatic discount."'42 The court was particularly concerned that an advertised automatic price reduction "would attract and benefit new buyers who
43
are not Class Members," creating something of a moral hazard.
While this aversion to compensating the uninjured has not hindered
certifying courts in the past,4 Judge Berman took the position that the
"automatic price reductions plan is fundamentally flawed because it
depends ultimately on the alleged pattern of repeat purchase[s] by a
'45
core group of customers.
It is worth pausing to ask what normative theory explains courts'
recent concern with compensating the uninjured in small-claims consumer class actions-or, more particularly, why this concern weighs so
heavily that courts are willing to deny class certification, thereby precluding any injured parties from receiving compensation and, more
importantly, thwarting the core value of deterring corporate wrongdoing that is traditionally understood to underlie the class action
device.

46

41. Id. at *25. Specifically, the plaintiffs' expert asserted that an automatic price reduction
would primarily benefit injured class members because "approximately 90% of all purchases of
Del Monte Gold Pineapples are made by repeat purchasers." Id. The district court refused to
credit this assertion, finding it was based on unsupported and unreviewed data. Id. at 25-26.
However, there seems to be a strong argument to be made that Del Monte pineapples are so
dominant in the market-due in part to the company's illegal monopolization tactics, Del Monte
has more than thirty percent of the market-that any prior or future purchase of a pineapple is
likely to have been Del Monte branded. See FRESH DEL MONTE PRODUCE INC., 2008 ANNUAL

2, http:/l/ibrary.corporate-ir.netlibrary/10/108/108461/items/329184/A23BEIAI-ODB34205-BB6A-1C489233B8ECFDPAR.pdf.
42. In re Fresh Del Monte, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *23 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also New York v. Dairylea Coop. Inc., 547 F. Supp. 306, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
("[T]his [settlement] plan seems unfair to those actually injured for it makes no effort to specifically reimburse those who were allegedly overcharged in the past but in effect is a payout to
future milk drinkers in general." (footnotes omitted)).
43. Id. at *23.
44. See, e.g., Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 59 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (automatic telephone charge reductions); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967) (automatic taxicab
rate reductions); see also Natalie A. DeJarlais, Note, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 753-55 (1987)
(listing cases approving class settlements that included automatic price reductions on future
purchases of defendants' product).
45. In re Fresh Del Monte, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *10 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
46. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 11, at 105 ("All that matters is whether [class actions]
cause[ I the defendant-wrongdoer to internalize the social costs of its actions.").
REPORT
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One might argue that the "compensating the uninjured" problem
has real import because every dollar that goes to an uninjured party is
a dollar that is unavailable to compensate an injured class member.
But as a practical matter, this explanation is wholly unsatisfying. In

practice, a very small percentage of eligible consumer claimants make
submissions to class action claims administrators. 47 Invariably, in
small-claims consumer class actions, less than twenty percent or so of
48
class action damages funds are distributed to plaintiff claimants.

That being the case, it is simply not true that compensation of uninjured parties affects the compensation interests of injured class members. On the other hand, it is certainly true that in the absence of class
certification, injured consumers are unlikely to receive any compensation, and more significantly, the vast majority of corporate malfea49
sance goes unchecked.
2.

Formal Claims Procedures: The Undercompensating-the-Injured
Problem

Whereas the rejection of automatic price reductions was driven by a
concern with compensating uninjured plaintiffs, the main perceived
shortcoming of a traditional claims submission procedure-in which

claimants must present proof to a claims administrator that they purchased the product at issue within certain parameters 5 0-is

that it

does a poor job of getting compensation to injured plaintiffs. This is
the core holding of Fresh Del Monte Pineapples: consumers are un-

likely to have the receipts or other qualifying documents that a rigor47. See, e.g., Gail Hillebrand & Daniel Torrence, Claims Proceduresin Large Consumer Class
Actions and Equitable Distribution of Benefits, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 747, 751 (1988) (reporting that in a class action against Levi Strauss Co., "only 14% to 33% of eligible class members applied for refunds of clothing price overcharges"; that in a real estate antitrust class action,
only 10.5% of class members sought settlement funds; and that in a class action against Wells
Fargo, "the claims rate for refunds was significantly less than 5%").
48. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and
Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 120 (2007), stating that
there are so many examples of shockingly low participation rates that what used to be
extreme is becoming ordinary. In one suit against Wells Fargo, less than 5% of the
eligible class members bothered to claim their cash refunds under the settlement plan.
In extreme cases, the [participation] rate has been less than one percent. In one class
action with forty million members, only 228 individuals actually filed claims against the
settlement fund.
49. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra note 11, at 106.
50. See, e.g., Strategic Claims Services, http://www.strategicclaims.net (last visited Sept. 19,
2009) (describing the types of case-specific documentation required of claimants, including dates
of purchase, point of purchase, and place of residence); A.B. Data, Ltd., Class Action Administration, http://www.abdatalawserve.com (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) (same); see also Kenneth R.
Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 98-100 (1990)
(describing distribution guidelines established by claims administrators).
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ous claims administration process would require, and even if they do,

it is unlikely that any given consumer will ever see the notice of settlement. 51 That being the case, the court despairs of meaningfully compensating injured plaintiffs via a traditional claims submission
procedure.
There is, to be sure, a sense of realism in the court's treatment of
these issues. 52 No one keeps the receipt for a pineapple, and any notice program is unlikely to reach more than a handful of consumers.

But if it is realism we are after, why stop there? Even if the consumer
is able to obtain proof of purchase (e.g., from a credit card company)
and even if she has, against all odds, actually seen the notice of the

claims procedure, we can be certain that she will not undertake the
time and effort required to comply with a traditional claims submission process. 53 The plain reality is that small-claims consumer class

actions are poor vehicles for getting compensation into the hands of
injured parties.
To the extent that courts are truly concerned with compensating injured plaintiffs, the rigorous insistence on proof-of-purchase is
counterproductive. If one's goal is to ensure that compensation flows

to injured parties, the most important step we can take is to relax the
filter that prevents uninjured parties from obtaining compensation.
Proof-of-purchase requirements may do a good job of keeping damages from the uninjured, but courts' extravagant concern with compensating the uninjured does an equally effective job of keeping
damages from the truly injured.
So it appears inarguable that the rigorous insistence on proof-ofpurchase directly undercuts both the values of compensating injured
51. In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapples Antitrust Litig., No. 1:04-md-1628 (RMB), 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18388, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008) ("[N]one of the named Plaintiffs possesses
receipts or other proof of purchases made during the Class Period, and Plaintiffs have offered no
evidence that other Class Members possess such proof.").
52. Also realistic is the court's assessment that automatic price reductions may undercompensate injured parties because they are underinclusive: "[A] number of retail stores which once
purchased Del Monte Gold pineapples no longer buy [them] .... Class members who patronize
those stores would not benefit from the automatic discount plan." Id. at *24.
53. Even if a claimant were to undertake the time and effort, some courts have held that
claims procedures that rely solely on a claimant's own authority are inherently problematic for
purposes of certification. See, e.g., In re Teflon Prods. Liab. Litig., 254 F.R.D. 354, 363 (S.D.
Iowa 2008) ("[T]he proposed representative's own testimony, coupled with the cookware item
itself, were the only evidence available to establish membership" in the class and "[n]either have
been shown to be particularly reliable"); In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig.,
214 F.R.D. 614, 617 (W.D. Wash. 2003) ("It is unrealistic to suppose that defendants will accept
sworn oaths or affidavits under these circumstances."); Ludke v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., No.
MC 00-1954, 2001 WL 1673791, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2001) ("[C]ertification of the proposed
class here would be an invitation for fraud.").
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plaintiffs and of deterring wrongdoing. And it does so with brutal efficiency by front-loading essentially remedial concerns into the class
certification analysis and creating a test that small-claim consumer
class actions-almost by definition-cannot meet.
All of this, of course, begs the question of just what value is being
served by maintaining such a tight filter against compensating the uninjured. A doctrinal response would be to say that construing Rule 23
in a fashion that allows uninjured parties to share in damages violates
the Rules Enabling Act.54 In the Light Cigarettes case, the Second
Circuit recently held that "[r]oughly estimating the gross damages to
the class as a whole and only subsequently allowing for the processing
of individual claims would inevitably alter defendants' substantive
right to pay damages reflective of their actual liability. ' '55 According
to that court, "This kind of disconnect offends the Rules Enabling
Act, which provides that federal rules of procedure, such as Rule 23,
cannot be used to 'abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive

right.'

"56

But the Rules Enabling Act argument is reflective of a legal philosophy that fundamentally misapprehends the purpose of class actions.
In proof-of-purchase cases such as Fresh Del Monte Pineapples, the
defendant's aggregate liability is not much in doubt: Judge Berman
had no trouble calculating the gross overcharge incurred by all consumers, whoever they may be, due to Fresh Del Monte's illegal conduct. What he could not calculate, because of the proof-of-purchase
problem, was which consumers were owed damages as a result of the
defendant's conduct.
In the context of the Rules Enabling Act, the question on the table
is whether a "defendant's substantive rights" are abridged if a class is
certified when the defendant's aggregate liability is known, but the
identity of injured consumers and the extent to which each consumer
was injured are not known. My own view is that the defendant's
rights are not abridged in that scenario. My perspective is grounded
in the view that class actions are a form of representative litigation,
quite like parens patriae suits brought by state attorneys general to
54. Insofar as "individual" proof of damages is thought to be an essential element of a claim,
any perceived lessening of the plaintiff's burden on this point may be said to "eliminat[e] or
erod[e]" traditional or statutory requirements thereby altering substantive law in violation of the
Rules Enabling Act. In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1014 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
417 U.S. 156 (1974); Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43, 50 (D. Del
1974)).
55. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co. (Light Cigarettes), 522 F.3d 215. 231 (2d Cir. 2008).
56. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).
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vindicate consumer rights.57 In this public law paradigm, the defendant's rights are not abridged so long as its aggregate liability is fairly
established. 58 Difficulties in allocating damages at the individual
claimant level do not abridge the defendant's rights. Indeed, on this
model, such difficulties are none of the defendant's business. 59 As the
leading treatise on class actions asserts,
Aggregate computation of class monetary relief is lawful and
proper. Courts have not required absolute precision as to damages
and have allowed damages to be proven by reference to the class as
a whole, rather than by reference to each individual class member.
Challenges that such aggregate proof affects substantive law and
otherwise violates the defendant's due process or jury rights to contest each member's claim individually, will not withstand analysis. 60
There is a competing, private law paradigm at work under the surface of cases like the Light Cigarettes case and the proof-of-purchase
consumer cases. Unlike parens patriae or the public law paradigm,
this private law view conceptualizes the class action as simply an aggregation of one-on-one lawsuits-as a procedural device, like joinder
or consolidation. 61 On this view, the defendant has a right to pay
nothing more than it would pay if it were facing individual suits from
each potential claimant. On this model, the defendant's aggregate liability should not exceed the sum of liability that would result from a
multitude of individual trials-in which the defendant asserts the de57. Parenspatriae legislation specifically authorizes state attorneys general to sue on behalf of
their injured citizens. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c
(2006) (permitting parenspatriae suits under the federal antitrust statutes); Richard P. Ieyoub &
Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney GeneralActions, the Tobacco Litigation,and the Doctrineof
Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1859, 1863 (2000) (noting that in parenspatriae actions "a state
may recover costs or damages incurred because of behavior that threatens the health, safety, and
welfare of the state's citizenry").
58. Indeed, some have argued that defendants' aggregate liability should be greater than the
total loss suffered by the plaintiffs, as a means of further encouraging defendants to honor their
duty of care. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562, 563 (1991). While I need not take on this
argument here, it is worth noting that "decoupling" compensation and deterrence has been an
approach that a number of scholars have thoughtfully examined. See generally, e.g., David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for
Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871 (2002).

59. See Barnett, supra note 19, at 1595 ("When the court can infer the existence of these
injured individuals from the evidence and can calculate the aggregate amount of claims, the class
action device ought to permit satisfaction of the claims.").
60. 3 CorNrE & NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10:5 (2002).

61. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, UnattainableJustice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of JudicialPower, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1746 (1992) (observing that "transactionalism," embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made possible "the joinder of other
persons affected by the same series of events").
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fense of failure to prove injury-against each potential claimant. 62 To
illustrate, suppose that a defendant such as Fresh Del Monte went to

trial in 1,000,000 separate cases, that the plaintiffs in each case sought
damages of $10, and that in 990,000 of those cases, the defendant won
because the plaintiff-consumer failed to offer proof of purchase and

hence establish injury. In the one-on-one paradigm, Fresh Del
Monte's aggregate liability is $100,000 (10,000 victorious plaintiffs
multiplied by $10), and it should pay not one dollar more than that
63

amount.
So in the end, doctrinaire references to the Rules Enabling Act do a
poor job of explaining the value of rules that so tightly guard against

compensating the uninjured at the expense of sacrificing the compensation of the injured and the deterrence of the wrongdoing. Something else is going on-and in my view, that "something else" is
fidelity to the private law paradigm.
3.

The Cy Pres Muddle

This same private law conception of the class action suggests that
courts would be hostile to the concept of cy pres distributions. Cy pres
is a doctrine borrowed from trust law, where it applies to preserve
testamentary charitable gifts that would otherwise fail. If a charitable
gift can no longer be carried out as the testator intended, the cy pres

doctrine allows the "next best" use of the funds to satisfy the testator's

intent "as near as possible." 64 In the class action context, cy pres refers "to the distribution of unclaimed or unclaimable funds to persons
not found to be injured, but who have interests similar to those of the
65
class."
62. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co. (Light Cigarettes), 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008)
(stating that an "aggregate determination [of damages] is likely to result in an astronomical
damages figure that does not accurately reflect the number of plaintiffs actually injured by defendants and that bears little or no relationship to the amount of economic harm actually caused
by defendants").
63. See Barnett, supra note 19, at 1608. Barnett asserts that when an argument is based on the
Rules Enabling Act, courts must consider "the specific substantive rights of the parties under the
statute invoked to determine whether they have been altered by this application of Rule 23." Id.
Barnett points out that "[w]hen plaintiffs sue under statutes drawn to serve principles of deterrence and disgorgement," it cannot be argued that the remedy has altered the parties' substantive rights, but when "plaintiffs invoke statutes drawn explicitly to provide compensation to a
narrow range of injured parties, a conflict may result." Id.
64. See In re Vitamin Cases, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 429 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (recounting the
history of the cy pres doctrine).
65. In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See
generally Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 107 (1997) (providing a broad theoretical framework for evaluating the
costs and benefits of various types of nonpecuniary class action settlements, and asserting that cy
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Predictably, contemporary courts have aggressively rejected attempts to rely upon the cy pres doctrine at the class certification stage.
That is, courts have refused to certify classes where plaintiffs try to
side step the ascertainability requirement by asserting that, at the subsequent remedial stage, they will seek to distribute damages under cy
pres. Instead, courts invariably hold that the cy pres doctrine "does
not circumvent the bedrock principle that members of a class must be
identifiable. ' 66 For example, in In re PPA, the district court explicitly
rejected cy pres as a solution to ascertainability:
Here, the court's concerns lie in more than simply how to distribute
unclaimed damages. Instead, the court faces the daunting task of
determining who could claim those damages in the first place.
Given plaintiffs' supposition that tens of millions of dollars are at
stake, and the incredibly difficult and time consuming process of
distributing portions of that amount on an individual basis, at approximately three dollars per product, the adoption of a fluid recovery procedure would not serve
to lesson the manageability problems
67
plaguing the proposed class.
Similarly, those courts that have relied on cy pres arguments at the
68
certification stage in recent years have been overruled or reversed.
pres settlements are common where "the class is large, each member has a small claim, and a
large fraction of the class either cannot be identified or is unlikely to file a claim even if notified
of the lawsuit").
66. In re Neurontin Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 244 F.R.D. 89, 113 (D. Mass 2007); accord
Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675-76 (7th Cir. 1981) (declining to certify class and rejecting "any
approach which would automatically utilize a fluid recovery mechanism as a procedural alternative to class action disposition"); In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 89-90 (9th Cir. 1974)
(rejecting the use of fluid recovery as a means of circumventing proof of individual injury under
Rule 23); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (finding that the fluid recovery regime established by the
district court would have allowed plaintiffs to satisfy the manageability requirements of Rule 23
when they otherwise could not); Dumas v. Albers Med., Inc., No. 03-0640-CV-W-GAF, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33482, at *7 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 7, 2005) (stating that fluid recovery "is not
appropriate when it is used to assess the damages of the class without proof of damages suffered
by individual class members" and class action was otherwise unmanageable).
67. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 620 (W.D. Wash.
2003).
68. See, e.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675 (7th Cir. 1981).
Plaintiffs apparently contend that the harmed individuals cannot be identified and
therefore a fluid recovery should be utilized. Strictly speaking, plaintiffs' contention
proves too much. It sets forth no criteria for determining when class certification is
unnecessary and when the requirements of class certification may be restructured. Indeed, to accept plaintiffs' position would be to ignore the requirements of Rule 23, such
as whether an identifiable class exists and whether notice to the class can be executed.
Id.; see also In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust Litig., 235 F.R.D. 127, 144 (D.
Me. 2006) (use of fluid recovery to calculate damages does not defeat class certification), rev'd,
522 F.3d 6 (lst Cir. 2008); Schwab v.Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. CV 04-1945 (JBW), 2005 WL
3032556 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2005), rev'd sub nom. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215
(2d Cir. 2008).
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None of this is surprising. What is noteworthy is that cy pres survives at all. Given the supremacy of the private law conception of
class actions, and its core "unity principle," courts' continued receptivity to cy pres distributions at the remedial stage is fairly astonishing.
After all, the animating theory behind an ascertainability requirement
in the first instance is a conservative conception of justice that insists
upon precisely the values that cy pres flouts: an unremitting identity
69
between injured plaintiffs and the recipients of damages funds.
And yet, in terms that bespeak a decidedly public law orientation to
class actions, courts routinely reaffirm the cy pres concept, as first endorsed over twenty years ago by the California Supreme Court:
Fluid recovery may be essential to ensure that the policies of disgorgement or deterrence are realized. Without fluid recovery, defendants may be permitted to retain ill-gotten gains simply because
amounts intheir conduct harmed large numbers of people in small
70
stead of small numbers of people in large amounts.
This public-private disconnect is striking, as courts affirm cy pres at
the remedial stage under what can only be a public law rationale,
while rejecting it at the certification stage, under what can only be a
private law rationale. In a bid to ameliorate the cognitive dissonance
of it all, I think many courts have thus stretched to find a private lawfriendly justification for the distribution of settlement proceeds via cy
pres. This is most commonly expressed in the demand for evidence
that the requested cy pres distributions will benefit current or absent
class members. 71 For example, in State v. Levi Strauss & Co., the Cali69. See George Krueger & Judd Serotta, Editorial,'Our Class-Action System Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2008, at A13 (criticizing cy pres awards in which courts distribute
money "in an ad hoc manner, to people who are not even in the class, who would not have had
standing to sue, and who were never even alleged to have been wronged").
70. California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564, 570-71 (Cal. 1986) (internal citations omitted); see also Boyle v. Giral, 820 A.2d 561, 569 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding cy pres appropriate
when "direct distribution of settlement funds to individual class members is impractical; and
where important consumer goals, such as disgorgement of ill-gotten gains from and deterrence
of future over-pricing and manipulation of market allocation ... can be achieved"); Bellows v.
NCO Fin. Sys., Inc., No. 3:07-cv-01413-W-AJB, 2009 WL 35466 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2009) (describing a Special Master's report on the distribution of unclaimed class settlement funds to cy pres
recipients); Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 362 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (E.D. Pa.
2005) (authorizing cy pres distribution of settlement funds to NFL Youth Education Town Centers in an antitrust action regarding bundled NFL programming); In re Motorsports Merch.
Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1392, 1395 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (authorizing cy pres distribution of
settlement funds to nine charities in an action that alleged a conspiracy to fix prices on NASCAR
race souvenirs).
71. See, e.g., In re Airline Ticket Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 307 F.3d 679, 684 (8th Cir. 2002) (in
the settlement of an antitrust class action suit against various airlines, reversing a district court
grant of otherwise undistributable cy pres settlement funds to the National Association for Public Interest Law on the grounds that a better recipient of the funds would be travel agencies
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fornia court noted that cy pres funds should "be used in California for

a purpose that is reasonably designed to benefit those persons who
72
would otherwise have received the fund."

Other courts appear more at ease with the public law function of cy
pres remedies and are therefore more candid in acknowledging that
these distributions confer little or no benefit to class members, but

rather serve the broader public interests of disgorgement and deterrence. 73 Indeed, some courts have even allowed an entire settlement
award-not merely the undistributed residue-to be used for a cy pres
remedy when individual recoveries would be too small and therefore
too costly to distribute. 74 These courts take a purely public law perspective on class actions, wherein cy pres is desirable because it forces
"[d]isgorgement of illegal gains from wrongdoers" and it "fulfill[s] the
deterrence objectives of class actions. '75 Judge Posner put it best in a
case upholding a cy pres distribution: "There is no indirect benefit to
indirectly affected by the anticompetitive conduct); Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Wash. Metro.
Area Transit Comm'n, 84 F.3d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that the cy pres doctrine is based
on the premise that the funds should be "distributed to the 'next best' class when the plaintiffs
cannot be compensated individually"). One commentator has stated,
The primary criterion that should govern the appropriateness of a cy pres award, both
from the standpoint of its legal permissibility and in choosing between alternative candidates for the award, is that the award should come as close as possible to benefiting
the same group of class members to whom it proves impractical to provide direct
compensation.
J. Douglas Richards, What Makes an Antitrust Class Action Remedy Successful?: A Tale of Two
Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REv. 621, 649-50 (2005); cf. Stewart R. Shepherd, Damage Distribution
in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 448, 457 (1972) ("The goal of the cy
pres remedy ... is to effectuate the normal damage distribution to class members as closely as
possible, and this should be the purpose of the courts whenever feasible." (footnotes omitted)).
72. Superior Beverage Co. v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 477, 479 (N.D. Il.1993); see
also Vasquez v. Super. Ct. of San Joaquin Valley, 484 P.2d 964 (Cal. 1971); James R. McCall et
al., Greater Representation for California Consumers-Fluid Recovery, Consumer Trust Funds,
and Representative Actions, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 797, 799 (1995).
73. See Nelson v. Greater Gadsden Hous. Auth., 802 F.2d 405,409 (11th Cir. 1986) (unclaimed
settlement funds to be used by the housing authority to increase energy efficiency in public
housing units); In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197,
209 (D. Me. 2003) ("[M]embers of the public (and thus potentially class members who did not
file a claim, as well as those who did) will benefit either in using the CDs themselves or in the
general public benefit from recurrent music CD availability."); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 440 F.2d 1079, 1083 (2d Cir. 1971) (antitrust
class action settlement included the creation of a trust fund that would benefit consumers as a
whole).
74. See, e.g., Gammon v. GC Servs. Ltd., 162 F.R.D. 313, 321 (N.D. I11.
1995) (finding that cy
pres distribution of the entire damage award was authorized in a class action with over four
million potential class members, each of whom would be entitled to thirteen cents).
75. Id. But see Krueger & Serotta, supra note 69, at A13, which states that
[cjourts are empowered to resolve... specific disputes, and not to transfer a corporate
defendant's assets to an outside organization that has not appeared before the court.
The Constitution does not give courts the authority to satisfy notions of "deterrence"
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the class from the defendant's giving the money to someone else. In
'76
such a case the 'cy pres' remedy ... is purely punitive.
III.

THE PRIVATE LAW UNITY PRINCIPLE

As we have seen, the ascertainability requirement is founded upon
a perspectival theory that views the class action as simply an aggregation of one-on-one cases in which an injured party seeks compensation from a defendant. Cy pres, with its built-in disunity between the
plaintiff and the recipient of the damages award, is a perversion of this
private law model, which demands-to the extent possible-unity between the injured persons, the prosecutors of the action, and the recipients of damages awards.
The normative underpinnings of the private law model's unity principle are not totally obvious. Certainly, there appears to be a sort of
Burkean conservative reverence for history, and particularly, the long
experience of the common law with discrete disputes pressed by a
concrete claimant demanding to be made whole for a past wrong.
Likewise, a mistrust of experimentation and a suspicion of the agendas that may be served by the public law model is quite plausibly at
work here. One could also argue that there are instrumental or utilitarian objectives served by insisting upon adherence to the private law
model.
Two distinct areas of the law-the imposition of punitive damages
and the rules governing standing in antitrust litigation-provide laboratories for stress testing the private law unity principle, and they may
enable us to further draw out the normative foundations upon which
this principle rests.
A.

Accounting for Punitive Damages

The conservative account of the private law unity principle fails to
accommodate at least one deeply rooted common law tradition: the
law of punitive damages. The conventional understanding provides
that punitive and exemplary damages are not meant to compensate
the plaintiffs for their injuries.7 7 Instead, they are meant to punish
by giving institutions like legal aid societies or universities windfalls when those entities
are not even parties to the lawsuit.
76. Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 2004).
77. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) ("[Punitive damages] are
not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence."). See also In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), which states that
[i]t is axiomatic that the purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate plaintiffs for
their injury, but to punish defendants for their wrongdoing. In theory, therefore, when
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and deter the wrongdoers. 78 As one commentator put it, "[A] punitive damages award is a civil punishment visited upon defendants to

vindicate the public interest in deterrence, and to penalize conduct
that violates the social contract and injures society.

' 79

Disunity is hard-wired into punitive damages. In some jurisdictions,
a percentage of the punitive damages award escheats to the state or is
otherwise directed to third party beneficiaries.80 These arrangements
institutionalize the disunity that the private law model abhors. 81 But
with or without split-recovery schemes, third parties are at the heart
of punitive damages. The irreducible core function of punitive or exemplary damages is to exact payment from a defendant that is de-

signed to deter future misconduct towards others.82 There is an
important body of literature addressing other values that punitive
damages may serve, 83 but I am not aware of any suggestion that the
goal is merely to deter future conduct towards the individual plaintiff.
Recent law in this area is characterized by discomfort with the public law underpinnings of punitive damages. For example, in Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court held that as a matter

of due process, a punitive damages award may not redress injuries
a plaintiff recovers punitive damages against a defendant, that represents a finding by
the jury that the defendant was sufficiently punished for the wrongful conduct.
78. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2621 (2008) ("[T]he consensus
today is that punitives are aimed not at compensation but principally at retribution and deterring
harmful conduct."); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("Punitive damages
may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct
and deterring its repetition.").
79. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Unfinished Business: Reaching the Due Process Limits of Punitive
Damages in Tobacco Litigation Through Unitary Classwide Adjudication, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 979, 981 (2001).
80. See Paul B. Rietema, Recent Development, Reconceptualizing Split-Recovery Statutes:
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007), 31 HARV. J.L. & Pun. POL'Y 1159, 1160 &
n.6 (2008) (listing the nine states that have "implemented split-recovery statutes" and describing
"this framework (as] shift[ing] a portion of the punitive damage award to society").
81. See Michael Finch, Giving Full Faith and Credit to Punitive Damages Awards: Will Florida
Rule the Nation?, 86 MINN. L. REV. 497, 502 (2002) ("[An increasing number of states have
reaffirmed the penal role of punitive damages by appropriating a share of the plaintiff's punitive
award. Such shared recovery laws emphasize that punitive awards now vindicate 'public
wrongs,' and so fulfill the historical purpose of penal laws.").
82. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 358-59 (2007) (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (asserting that while awarding "compensatory damages to remedy ... third-party harm might well
constitute a taking of property from the defendant without due process," punitive damages are
specifically awarded to vindicate "the public harm the defendant's conduct has caused or
threatened"); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998).
83. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstandingthe
History of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2003); Benjamin Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 170 (2005).

2010]

HOSTILITY TO CLASS ACTIONS

that a defendant inflicted upon third parties-at least expressly, that
is, as a matter of jury instruction. 8 4 Indeed, the Philip Morris Court
asserted that "to permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim
would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages
equation," and it seemed concerned about the same sorts of identification problems that plague the ascertainability doctrine in class action
jurisprudence: "How many [third party] victims are there? How seriously were they injured? Under what circumstances did injury occur?"8 5 This analysis, I think, reflects an attempt to put the
intrinsically square public law peg of punitive damages into the round
hole of the private law model-a doctrinal development redolent of
86
the private law approach to class actions.
Even the Court's proportionality analysis of punitive damages
awards, developed in a series of cases over the past decade,87 can be
interpreted as a private law intervention into an otherwise public law
remedy. As some scholars have observed, "Because punitive damages
are designed to serve the public law functions of punishment, deterrence, and retribution, there is no compelling reason why there should
'88
be any correlation between compensatory and punitive damages.
The idea behind proportionality analysis appears rooted in nothing
more than discomfort with the public law model. In my view, courts
require a quantitative relationship between compensatory and punitive damages not because there is any qualitative relationship between
the injury to an individual plaintiff and the amount required to deter
84. 549 U.S. at 353 ("The Constitution's Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive
damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those whom
they directly represent, i. e., injury that it inflicts upon those who are, essentially, strangers to the
litigation."). This decision "clos[es] the door to recovery for harms to nonparties-a door left
ajar in State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell." Rietema, supra note 80, at
1160.
85. Phillip Morris, 549 U.S. at 354.
86. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages
As Punishmentfor Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 588-589 (2003), asking
whether it is ever permissible, in circumstances in which the defendant's conduct
harmed more than one person, to award in a case brought by a single victim punitive
damages in an amount that is intended to punish the defendant's entire course of conduct, or whether, instead, the law limits each plaintiffs recovery to the amount necessary to punish the defendant only for the harm done to the individual plaintiff.
87. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
88. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REv. 91, 140 n.242 (1993); see also Colby, supra note 86,
at 607 ("[I]f punitive damages were punishment for the full scope of the wrong to society, rather
than simply the wrong to the plaintiff, it would make no sense to require a reasonable relationship between the amount of punitive damages and the amount of the individual plaintiffs compensatory damages.").
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and punish a defendant. Instead, courts require it because they feel
uncomfortable straying from the private law model.
Martin Redish's work highlights this thesis. Professor Redish and
his colleague Andre W. Matthews argue that modern punitive damages represent an unconstitutional delegation of state power:
"[P]urely public power to punish is being exercised by purely private
actors who are naturally ... focused not necessarily on furthering the
public interest but rather ... on pursuit of their own narrow interests."' 89 Redish's discomfort with a public law model is such that he
would wipe out all punitive damages jurisprudence as unconstitutional, but he suffers no illusions about the endemic public law function of punitive damages.
The connection of all this to class actions is likewise illustrated by
reference to Professor Redish, who has argued that in small-claims
class actions, which are necessarily "lawyer-driven," courts are applying Rule 23 procedures to augment a substantive federal statute, effectively grafting a qui tam provision onto a law that contains no such
remedy. 90 Redish would have courts hold that "Rule 23 may not be
applied to lawyer-driven suits, lest it conflict with the remedial scheme
of the substantive congressional enactment upon which the suit is
based. Alternatively, he would settle for legislation banning the widespread scourge of lawyer-driven class actions." 91 Here again, the discomfort with any public law model is palpable. And here again, we
see that real fidelity to the private law model would entail total discontinuation of practices that have undeniable public law
underpinnings.
Professor Redish at least recognizes the undeniable, while current
doctrine is preoccupied with denying the undeniable. Dressing inherently public law enterprises in the garb of private law models leads to
confused policies, both in the punitive damages area and in class action practice. But more to the point here is the sheer pull of the private law model, the powerful drive to conform current doctrine to an
idealized form of private law unity.
So to return to the question: what does this brief exploration of punitive damages tell us about why courts are driven by the value of
adherence to the private law model? Respect for long-established
89. Martin H. Redish & Andrew L. Mathews, Why Punitive Damages Are Unconstitutional,53
L.J. 1, 2 (2004).
90. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection
of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77-83.
91. Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming,Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 373 (2005).
EMORY
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common law traditions with which courts have long experience, and a
concomitant distrust of experimentation, may have explanatory power
in many contexts. But all else being equal, respect for common law
traditions provides a singularly bad explanation for eviscerating common law traditions, such as the centuries-old practice of allowing exemplary damages awards in order to deter future injury to third

parties.
B.

Indirect PurchaserStanding Rules

Searching out the normative underpinnings of the private law
model may have some explanatory force. Do courts adhere to the
private law unity principle in an effort to build a better mousetrapthat is, are they seeking to make the system work more efficiently and
further statutory objectives?

One interesting area to explore in assessing these questions is the
Hanover Shoe-Illinois Brick doctrine concerning the antitrust standing
of so-called "indirect purchasers." In the typical case, indirect purchasers are the ultimate consumers who purchased goods or services
from a direct purchaser-often a retailer or wholesaler-who in turn
purchased from the antitrust defendant-often a manufacturer. In
HanoverShoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., the U.S. Supreme
Court held that direct purchasers may sue to recover the full amount
of an illegal overcharge regardless of whether they recouped their
losses by passing the overcharge along to indirect, downstream purchasers. 92 Then, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that indirect purchasers lack standing to sue under the federal antitrust laws, even if there is evidence that they incurred the
93
overcharge.
Taken together, these decisions explicitly allow for-and in many
cases mandate-disunity among the injured party, the prosecutor of
the civil action, and the recipient of damages. Direct purchasers maintain the action and receive the damages, notwithstanding the fact that
they may have passed the overcharge on to their customers. Meanwhile, indirect purchasers who incurred the injury may not prosecute
the action and, of course, do not stand to receive damages.
The Hanover Shoe-Illinois Brick doctrine is intrinsically rooted in
the public law model.94 The rationale for the doctrine is that direct
purchasers are best situated to prosecute actions against antitrust de92. 392 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1968).
93. 431 U.S. 720, 729-33 (1977).
94. See, e.g., Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick: A FunctionalistApproach to the Indirect PurchaserRule, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 69, 74 (2007) ("The Court's
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fendants, 95 while the claims of indirect purchasers are beset with the
evidentiary problems related to tracing overcharges across multiple
layers of distribution and apportioning damages among plaintiffs at

multiple levels. 96 The statutory imperative guiding the analysis of the
Illinois Brick Court was to give full force and effect to the deterrent

objectives of the federal antitrust law. 97 Far less important in the public law view is whether the party that bears the injury reaps the damages reward.
The Illinois Brick doctrine makes for some strange legal bedfellows.
Any catalogue of champions of the public law model would doubtless
include the three dissenters in Illinois Brick-Justices Brennan, Black-

mun, and Marshall-who nonetheless expressed their strong preference for a compensation-based, private law approach to indirect
purchaser standing: "[I]n many instances, consumers, although indirect purchasers, bear the brunt of antitrust violations. To deny them
an opportunity for recovery is particularly indefensible when direct
purchasers ... pass on the bulk of their increased costs to consumers

farther along the chain of distribution. ' 98 According to the dissenters,
the majority was wrong to sacrifice the value of compensation to the
injured consumer in favor of deterrence of future violations. 99
Justice White, writing for the majority, insisted that compensation
was an objective of the antitrust laws, but declared that the Court was
"unwilling to carry the compensation principle to its logical extreme"
conclusion [in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick] relied on two functional objectives: avoidance of
litigation complexity and deterrence.").
95. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735 ("[A]ntitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by
concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct purchasers .... ").
96. Id. at 737 (reasoning that "[h]owever appealing this attempt to allocate the overcharge
might seem in theory, it would add whole new dimensions of complexity to treble-damages suits
and seriously undermine their effectiveness").
97. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 494 (voicing the concern that "those who violate the antitrust laws ... would retain the fruits of their illegality because no one was available who would
bring suit against them").
98. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Although the dissenting Justices may have aligned themselves with the private law model
by championing the rights of indirect purchasers to receive compensation, to be fair, they also
expressed this view in terms of deterrence. According to Justice Brennan, giving indirect purchasers standing to sue would ensure that antitrust violations are deterred, while pooling that
authority with direct purchasers-who often had ongoing business relations with the defendant-was not a sure deterrence bet. Id. at 749-50 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the years since
Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, much of the public and scholarly commentary has favored the
dissent's views. See, e.g., Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly
Overcharge:A Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269 (1979) (concurring with
the dissent in Illinois Brick that both direct and indirect purchasers should have standing to sue,
in order to further both the compensatory and deterrent functions of the antitrust statutes).
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if it materially impaired the key value of deterrence. 100 As the dissent
characterized the majority's position: "[F]rom the deterrence standpoint, it is irrelevant to whom damages are paid, so long as someone
redresses the violation." 10 1 The majority further justified its demotion
of the compensationalist rationale with the observations that recoveries in antitrust suits "often have failed to compensate the individuals
on behalf of whom the suits have been brought,"1 0 2 and that Congress
"recognize[d] that rarely, if ever, will all potential claimants actually
1 0°3
come forward to secure their share of the recovery.
Meanwhile, Richard Posner and William Landes defended the Hanover Shoe-Illinois Brick rule on classically public law grounds, reasoning that direct purchasers have better information than indirect
purchasers and are thus more likely to uncover violations and serve as
"more accurate and less costly private policemen."' 0 4 Indeed, Posner
and Landes fully engage the public law model, asserting that indirect
purchasers ultimately receive the benefits from any recovery secured
by direct purchasers in the form of lower prices.1 0 5 Sounding not unlike Judge Weinstein advocating cy pres distribution in the Agent Orange cases, Posner and Landes point to oblique benefits that are
expected to flow to injured consumers and affirm the broad, public
function of representative litigation.1 0 6 Certainly, their view, like that
of the majority in Illinois Brick, is wholly unconcerned with the spectacle of disunity among the prosecutors of antitrust actions, the injured parties, and the third-party beneficiaries of any recovery.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article represents, to my knowledge, the first scholarly effort
to examine the ascertainability doctrine that has emerged in recent
class action jurisprudence. As I have asserted, many (or even most)
small-claims consumer cases are now uncertifiable as class actions
under this putatively implicit requirement of Rule 23, which demands
100. Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746.
101. Id. at 760 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 747 n.31.
103. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-499, at 16 (1975)).
104. Richman & Murray, supra note 94, at 84 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
Should Indirect PurchasersHave Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 602, 609 (1979) [hereinafter Landes &
Posner, Economic Analysis]); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics
of Passing On: A Reply to Harris and Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1274, 1279 (1980) ("If all is
passed on, the direct purchaser has zero expected damages, and no incentive to sue. If most is
passed on, he has small expected damages, and hence little incentive to sue.").
105. See Landes & Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 104, at 605.
106. Id.
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that the identity of class members must, to some substantial but as-yet
untested degree, be ascertainable in order to certify a class. The primary doctrinal foundation for this requirement is the manageability
element of Rule 23(b)(3)(D) as applied to damages classes-that is,
the claim that ascertainability is necessary at the class certification
stage to ensure the efficacy, or manageability, of a subsequent distribution of damages.
The normative foundation of the ascertainability requirement is another matter. From the discussion in Part 1I, keying off the Fresh Del
Monte Pineapples case, I think it is clear that the traditional goals of
class actions-deterrence and compensation-cannot plausibly be
said to animate the ascertainability requirement. Indeed, the ascertainability requirement readily sacrifices both deterrence and compensation in favor of an alternative value, namely, ensuring that
compensation does not flow to uninjured parties.
This, in turn, begs the question of why we are so concerned with
ensuring that compensation does not flow to uninjured parties. While
some courts have suggested narrow rules-based answers (e.g., the
Rules Enabling Act argument discussed above), I think the explanation lies in a conception 'of class actions that is based on a private law
model-that is, a conception that demands unity among the injured
parties, the prosecutors of civil actions, and the beneficiaries of remedies. But this only begs another question: what accounts for the
power of the private law model? To try and get a handle on that question, I have looked well outside of the class action context to two areas of the law that raise the public law versus private law model issue
in different ways: punitive damages and antitrust standing.
Analysis of these areas of the law reveal that (1) at the very least,
conservative traditionalism certainly fails to explain insistence on the
private law model in any across-the-board way, as demonstrated by
the law of punitive damages; and (2) as illustrated in the debate over
antitrust standing, the issue of whether to adhere to a private law
model turns on instrumentalist policy choices. And indeed, the Hanover Shoe-Illinois Brick doctrine rests on a distinctly instrumentalist
policy choice to tolerate significant disunity as among the injured parties, the prosecutors of civil actions, and the beneficiaries of remedies.
What follows, then, is that the ascertainability doctrine either rises
or falls on policy grounds. There are no grand theoretic imperatives
that compel a judge to insist on application of an abstract "unity principle." The ascertainability doctrine makes sense if one favors the results to which it leads, and otherwise it does not. Upon examination,
it is apparent that the policy underpinnings of the ascertainability doc-
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trine are utterly incoherent. The doctrine flatly exalts the (supposed)
value of keeping uninjured parties from receiving compensation over
the very real values of deterrence and compensation. Measured
against the Supreme Court's unequivocal recognition that "[t]he policy at the very core of the class action mechanism" is to facilitate small
claims class actions, 10 7 it seems clear that the application of an ascertainability filter at the class certification stage is a recipe for making bad law.

107. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997).
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